Protocols for secure two-party computation enable a pair of parties to compute a function of their inputs while preserving security properties such as privacy, correctness and independence of inputs. Recently, a number of protocols have been proposed for the efficient construction of two-party computation secure in the presence of malicious adversaries (where security is proven under the standard simulation-based ideal/real model paradigm for defining security). In this paper, we present a protocol for this task that follows the methodology of using cut-and-choose to boost Yao's protocol to be secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Relying on specific assumptions (DDH), we construct a protocol that is significantly more efficient and far simpler than the protocol of Lindell and Pinkas (Eurocrypt 2007) that follows the same methodology. We provide an exact, concrete analysis of the efficiency of our scheme and demonstrate that (at least for not very small circuits) our protocol is more efficient than any other known today.
Introduction

Background
Protocols for secure two-party computation enable a pair of parties P 1 and P 2 with private inputs x and y, respectively, to compute a function f of their inputs while preserving a number of security properties. The most central of these properties are privacy (meaning that the parties learn the output f (x, y) but nothing else), correctness (meaning that the output received is indeed f (x, y) and not something else), and independence of inputs (meaning that neither party can choose its input as a function of the other party's input). The standard way of formalizing these security properties is to compare the output of a real protocol execution to an "ideal execution" in which the parties send their inputs to an incorruptible trusted party who computes the output for the parties. Informally speaking, a protocol is then secure if no real adversary attacking the real protocol can do more harm than an ideal adversary (or simulator) who interacts in the ideal model [14, 15, 32, 2, 3] . An important parameter when considering this problem relates to the power of the adversary. The two most studied models are the semi-honest model (where the adversary follows the protocol specification exactly but tries to learn more than it should by inspecting the protocol transcript) and the malicious model (where the adversary can follow any arbitrary polynomial-time strategy).
In the 1980s powerful feasibility results were proven, showing that any probabilistic polynomialtime two-party functionality can be securely computed in the presence of semi-honest adversaries [41] and in the presence of malicious adversaries [14] . These results showed that it is possible to achieve such secure protocols, but did not demonstrate how to do so efficiently (where by efficiency we mean a protocol that can be implemented and run in practice). To be more exact, the protocol of [41] for semi-honest adversaries is efficient. However, achieving security efficiently for the case of malicious adversaries is far more difficult. In fact, until recently, no efficient general protocols were known at all, where a general protocol is one that can be used for computing any functionality.
This situation has changed in the past few years, possibly due to increasing interest from outside the cryptographic community in secure protocols that are efficient enough to be used in practice. The result has been that a number of secure two-party protocols were presented that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries, where security is rigorously proven according to the aforementioned ideal/real model paradigm [23, 29, 35, 21] . Interestingly, these protocols all take novel, different approaches and so the secure-protocol skyline is more diverse than before, providing the potential for taking the protocols a step closer to very high efficiency. These protocols are discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.
We remark that the protocol of [29] has been implemented for the non-trivial problem of securely computing the AES block cipher (pseudorandom function), where one party's input is a secret key and the other party's input is a value to be "encrypted" [38] . A Boolean circuit for computing this function was designed with approximately 33,000 gates, and the protocol of [29] was implemented for this circuit. Experiments showed that the running-time of the protocol was between 18 and 40 minutes, depending on the assumptions taken on the primitives used to implement the protocol. Although this is quite a long time, for some applications it can be reasonable. In addition, it demonstrates that it is possible to securely compute functions with large circuits, and motivates the search for finding even more efficient protocols that can widen the applicability of such computations in real-world settings.
Our Results
In this paper, we follow the construction paradigm of [29] and significantly simplify and improve the efficiency of their construction. The approach of [29] is to carry out a basic cut-and-choose on the garbled circuit construction of Yao [41] . (See also [33] for a different protocol based on the cut-and-choose approach, but which does not provide security according to the standard ideal/real model paradigm.) We assume familiarity with Yao's protocol and refer to Appendix A for those not familiar. The cut-and-choose approach works by party P 1 constructing s copies of a garbled circuit and sending them to P 2 , who then asks P 1 to open half of them in order to verify that they are correctly constructed. If all of the opened circuits are indeed correct, then it is guaranteed that a majority of the unopened half are also correct, except with probability that is negligible in s. 1 Thus, P 1 and P 2 evaluate the remaining s/2 circuits, and P 2 takes the output that appears in most of the evaluated circuits. As discussed in [29] , P 2 cannot abort in the case that not all of the s/2 circuits evaluate to the same value, even though in such a case it knows that P 1 is cheating. The reason for this is that P 1 may construct a circuit that computes f in the case that P 2 's first bit equals 0, and otherwise it outputs random garbage. Now, with probability 1/2 this faulty circuit is not opened and so is one of the circuits to be evaluated. In this case, if P 2 would abort when it saw random garbage then P 1 would know that P 2 's first input bit equals 1. For this reason, P 2 takes the majority output and ignores minority values without aborting.
Although intuitively appealing, the cut-and-choose approach introduces a number of difficulties which significantly affect the efficiency of the protocol of [29] . First, since the parties need to evaluate s/2 circuits rather than one, there needs to be a mechanism to ensure that they use the same input in all evaluations (the solution for this for P 2 's inputs is easy, but for P 1 's inputs turns out to be hard). The mechanism used in [29] required constructing and sending 2s 2 ℓ commitments, where ℓ is the length of P 2 's input. In the implementation by [38] , they used s = 160 and ℓ = 128. Thus, the overhead due to these consistency proofs alone is the computation and transmission of 6, 553, 600 commitments! Another problem that arises in the cut-and-choose approach is that a malicious P 1 can input an incorrect key into one of the oblivious transfers used for P 2 to obtain the keys associated with its input wires in the garbled circuit. For example, it can set all the keys associated with 0 for P 2 's first input bit to be garbage, thereby making it impossible for P 2 to decrypt any circuit if its first input bit indeed equals 0. In contrast, P 1 can make all of the other keys be correct. In this case, P 1 is able to learn P 2 's first input bit, merely by whether P 2 obtains an output or not. The important observation is that the checks on the garbled circuit carried out by P 2 do not detect this because there is a separation between the cut-and-choose checks and the oblivious transfer. This adversarial strategy is called a selective failure attack [24] . The solution to this problem in [29] requires making the circuit larger and significantly increasing the size of the inputs by replacing each input bit with the exclusive-or of multiple random input bits. Finally, the analysis of [29] yields an error of 2 −s/17 . Thus, in order to obtain an error level of 2 −40 the parties need to exchange 680 circuits. We remark that it has been conjectured in [38] that the true error level of the protocol is 2 −s/4 ; however, this has not been proven.
Our protocol. We solve the aforementioned problems in a way that is far simpler and far more efficient than in [29] . In addition, we reduce the error probability to 2 −0.311s , for large enough s. A concrete calculation yields that for an error of 2 −40 it suffices to send only 132 circuits. This is an important improvement because the experiments of [38] demonstrate that the bottleneck in efficiency is not the exponentiations, but rather the number of circuits and the commitments for proving consistency. Thus, in our protocol we moderately increase the number of exponentiations, while reducing the number of circuits, completely removing the commitments, and also removing the need to increase the size of the inputs. We remark that the price for these improvements is that our protocol relies heavily on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, while the protocol of [29] used general assumptions only. We now proceed to describe our two main techniques:
1. Our solution for ensuring consistency of P 1 's inputs is to have P 1 determine the keys associated with its own input bits via a Diffie-Hellman pseudorandom synthesizer [34] . That is, P 1 chooses values g a 0 1 , g a 1 1 , . . . , g a 0 ℓ , g a 1 ℓ and g r 1 , . . . , g rs and then sets the keys associated with its ith input bit in the jth circuit to be g a 0 i ·r j , g a 1 i ·r j . Given all of the {g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g r j } values and any subset of keys of P 1 's input generated in this way, the remaining keys associated with its input are pseudorandom by the DDH assumption. Furthermore, it is possible for P 1 to efficiently prove that it used the same input in all circuits when the keys have this nice structure. We stress that the garbled values for the rest of the circuit are chosen as usual. Thus, it is still possible to use garbled-circuit optimizations like that presented in [25] .
2. As we have described, the reason that the inputs and circuits were needed to be made larger in [29] is due to the fact that the cut-and-choose circuit checks were separated from the oblivious transfer. In order to solve this problem, we introduce a new primitive called cutand-choose oblivious transfer. This is an ordinary oblivious transfer [39, 11] with the sender inputting many pairs (x 0 1 , x 1 1 ), . . . , (x 0 s , x 1 s ), and the receiver inputting many bits σ 1 , . . . , σ s . However, the receiver also inputs a set J ⊂ [s] of size exactly s/2. Then, the receiver obtains x σ i i for every i (as in a regular oblivious transfer) along with both values (x 0 j , x 1 j ) for every j ∈ J , while the sender learns nothing about σ 1 , . . . , σ s and J . The use of this primitive in our protocol intertwines the oblivious transfer and the circuit checks and solves the aforementioned problem. We also show how to implement this primitive in a highly efficient way, under the DDH assumption. We believe that this primitive is of independent interest, and could be useful in many cut-and-choose scenarios.
in the future. Nevertheless, as we will show, our protocol is significantly more efficient than the current best instantiations of the other approaches (at least, for not very small circuits).
• Committed input method (Jarecki-Shmatikov [23] ): The secure two-party protocol of [23] works by constructing a single circuit and proving that it is correct. The novelty of this protocol is that this can be done with only a constant number of (large modulus) exponentiations per gate of the circuit. Thus, for circuits that are relatively small, this can be very efficient. However, an exact count gives that approximately 720 exponentiations are required per gate. Thus, even for small circuits, this protocol is not yet practical. For large circuits like AES with 33,000 gates, the number of exponentiations is very large (23, 760, 000), and is not realistic. (The authors comment that if efficient batch proofs can be found for the languages they require then this can be significantly improved. However, to the best of our knowledge, no such improvements have yet been made.)
• LEGO (Nielsen-Orlandi [35] ): The LEGO protocol [35] follows the cut-and-choose methodology in a completely different way. Specifically, the circuit constructor first sends the receiver many gates, and the receiver checks that they are correctly constructed by asking for some to be opened. After this stage, the parties interact in a way that enables the gates to be securely soldered (like Lego blocks) into a correct circuit. Since it is not guaranteed that all of the gates are correct, but just a vast majority, a fault tolerant circuit of size O(s · |C|/ log |C|) is constructed, where s is a statistical security parameter. The error as a function of s is 2 −s and the constant inside the "O" notation for the number of exponentiations is 32 [36] . Thus, for an error of 2 −40 we have that the overall number of exponentiations carried out by the parties is 1280 · |C|/ log |C|. For large circuits, like that of AES, this is unlikely to be practical. (For example, for the AES circuit with 33,000 gates we have that the parties need to carry out 2, 816, 000 exponentiations. Observe that due to the size of the circuit, the log |C| factor is significant in making the protocol more efficient than [23] , as predicted in [35] . This protocol also relies on the DDH assumption. It is worthy to note that exponentiations in this protocol are in a regular "Diffie-Hellman" group and so Elliptic curves can be used, in contrast to [23] who work in Z * N .)
• Virtual multiparty method (Ishai et al. [21, 22] ): This method works by having the parties simulate a virtual multiparty protocol with an honest majority. The cost of the protocol essentially consists of the cost of running a semi-honest protocol for computing additive shares of the product of additive shares, for every multiplication carried out by a party in a multiparty protocol with honest majority. Thus, the actual efficiency of the protocol depends heavily on the multiparty protocol to be simulated, and the semi-honest protocols used for simulating the multiparty protocol. An asymptotic analysis demonstrates that this method may be competitive. However, no concrete analysis has been carried out, and it is currently an open question whether or not it is possible to instantiate this protocol in a way that will be competitive with other known protocols.
• Cut-and-choose on circuits (Lindell-Pinkas [29] ): Since this protocol has been discussed at length above, we just briefly recall that the complexity of the protocol is O(ℓ) oblivious transfers for input-length ℓ (where the constant inside here is not small because of the need to increase the number of P 2 's inputs), and the construction and computation of s garbled circuits and of 2s 2 ℓ commitments. In addition, the proven error of the protocol is 2 −s/17 and its conjectured error is 2 −s/4 . The actual error value has a significant impact on the efficiency.
In contrast to the above, the complexity of our protocol is as follows. The parties need to compute 15sℓ + 39ℓ + 10s + 6 exponentiations, where ℓ is the input length and s is a statistical security parameter discussed below. We further show that with optimizations the 15sℓ component can be brought down to just 5.66sℓ full exponentiations, and if preprocessing can be used then only sℓ/2 full exponentiations need to be computed after the inputs become known. (We remark that with preprocessing, the protocols of [35] and [21, 22] are also much more efficient.) In addition, the protocol requires the exchange of 7sℓ + 22ℓ + 7s + 5 group elements, and has 12 rounds of communication. Finally, there are 6.5|C|s symmetric encryptions for constructing and decrypting the garbled circuits and 4|C|s ciphertexts sent for transmitting these circuits. An important factor here is the value of s needed. The error of our protocol is 2 −0.311s for large enough s; a concrete calculation yields that for an error of 2 −40 it suffices to set s = 132. (The overhead of computing an AES circuit with |C| = 33, 000, ℓ = 128 and s = 132, is therefore about 96, 000 exponentiations, 28, 300, 000 symmetric encryptions, and communicating 270 Mbytes, where about 95% of the communication is spent on sending the garbled circuits.) Finally, we stress also that all of our exponentiations are of the basic Diffie-Hellman type and so can be implemented over Elliptic curves, which is much cheaper than RSA-type operations.
Preliminaries and Definitions
Throughout the paper we denote the computational security parameter by n, the statistical security parameter by s, and the length of inputs by ℓ. The computational security parameter is the usual one that is used to model the security of the underlying computational assumptions (e.g., the DDH assumption). In contrast, the statistical security parameter models a probability of cheating that is not due to any computational hardness, but rather holds in an information-theoretic sense. For example, the probability that an adversary passes a "cut-and-choose test" depends on how large the test is and how many items are opened, but does otherwise not directly depend on computational hardness. The distinction between the two types of security parameters is important because the size of the cut-and-choose test has a dramatic effect on the efficiency of the protocol and thus the exact probability of cheating is important to analyze. For example, in our protocol, we prove that the error due to the statistical security parameter s is approximately 2 −0.311s . In general, we define the notion of indistinguishability with respect to n and s, so that the error due to s is allowed only to be 2 −O(s) (if this does not hold, then there is probably no reason to differentiate between n and s).
We consider ensembles that are indexed by integers (security parameters) n and s, and by arbitrary strings a. Security is required to hold for all a, and this value a represents the parties' inputs; thus, we obtain security for all inputs, and for large enough values of n and s. Formally, we have the following definition: Definition 2.1 Let X = {X(a, n, s)} n,s∈N;a∈{0,1} * and Y = {Y (a, n, s)} n,s∈N;a∈{0,1} * be probability ensembles, so that for any n, s ∈ N the distribution X(a, n, s) (resp., Y (a, n, s)) ranges over strings of length polynomial in n+s. We say that the ensembles are (n,s)-indistinguishable, denoted X n,s ≡ Y , if there exists a constant 0 < c ≤ 1 such that for every non-uniform polynomial-time distinguisher D, every s ∈ N, every polynomial p(·) and all large enough n ∈ N, it holds that for every a ∈ {0, 1} * :
Observe that the above is required to hold for all s and all large enough n. This reflects the fact that we will be concrete in s and asymptotic only in n.
Definitions of security.
We refer the reader to [13, Chapter 7] for the definition of security for two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. The bulk of this paper is in this model. The only difference is that we require (n, s)-indistinguishability between the ideal and real distributions, rather than just regular computational indistinguishability. We also consider the models of universal composability and covert adversaries, and refer the reader to [4] and [1] , respectively, for appropriate definitions.
3 Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer
The Functionality and Construction Overview
Our protocol for secure two-party computation uses a new primitive that we call cut-and-choose oblivious transfer. Loosely speaking, a cut-and-choose OT is a batch oblivious transfer protocol (meaning an oblivious transfer for multiple pairs of inputs) with the additional property that the receiver can choose a subset of the pairs (of a predetermined size) for which it learns both values. This is a very natural primitive which has clear applications for protocols that are based on cutand-choose, as is our protocol here for general two-party computation.
The cut-and-choose OT functionality, denoted F ccot , with parameter s, is formally defined in Figure 3 .1, together with a variant functionality that we will need, which considers the case that R is forced to use the same choice σ in every transfer. This variant is denoted F S ccot .
FIGURE 3.1 (The cut-and-choose OT functionalities)
The cut-and-choose OT functionality F ccot :
• Inputs:
-R inputs σ 1 , . . . , σ s ∈ {0, 1} and a set of indices J ⊂ [s] of size exactly s/2.
• Output: If J is not of size s/2 then S and R receive ⊥ as output. Otherwise, -For every j ∈ J the receiver R obtains the pair (
The single-choice cut-and-choose OT functionality F S ccot : • Inputs: The same as above, but with R having only a single input bit σ.
• Output: The same as above, but with R obtaining the value x j σ for every j / ∈ J .
In order to motivate the usefulness of this functionality, we describe its use in our protocol. Oblivious transfer is used in Yao's protocol so that the party computing the garbled circuit (call it P 2 ) can obtain the keys (garbled values) on the wires corresponding with its input while keeping its input secret; see Appendix A. When applying cut-and-choose, many circuits are constructed and then half of them are opened, where opening means that P 2 receives all of the input keys to the circuit. By using cut-and-choose OT, P 2 receives all of its keys in the circuits to be opened directly, in contrast to having P 1 send them separately after the indices of the circuits to be opened are sent from P 2 to P 1 . The advantage of this approach is that P 1 cannot use different keys in the OT and when opening the circuit. See Section 4.1 for discussion on why this is important.
In cut-and-choose on Yao's protocol, one oblivious transfer is needed for every bit of P 2 's input, and P 2 should receive the keys associated with the bit in all of the circuits. In order to ensure that P 2 uses the same input in all circuits, we use the single-choice variant. We present the basic variant since it is of independent interest and may be useful in other applications.
Constructing cut-and-choose OT. The starting point for our construction of cut-and-choose OT is the universally composable protocol of Peikert et al. [37] ; we refer only to the instantiation of their protocol based on the DDH assumption because this is the most efficient. However, our protocol can use any of their instantiations. The protocol of [37] is cast in the common reference string (CRS) model, where the CRS is a tuple (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) where g 0 is a generator of a group of order q (in which DDH is assumed to be hard), g 1 = (g 0 ) y for some random y, and it holds that h 0 = (g 0 ) a and h 1 = (g 1 ) b where a ̸ = b. We first observe that it is possible for the receiver to choose this tuple itself, as long as it proves that it indeed fulfills the property that a ̸ = b. Furthermore, this can be proven very efficiently by setting b = a + 1; in this case, the proof that b = a + 1 is equivalent to proving that (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 ,
) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple (note that the security of [37] is based only on a ̸ = b and not on these values being independent of each other). We thus obtain a highly efficient version of the protocol of [37] in the stand-alone model.
Next, observe that the protocol of [37] has the property that if (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple (i.e., if a = b) then it is possible for the receiver to learn both values (of course, in a real execution this cannot happen because the receiver proves that a ̸ = b). This property is utilized by [37] to prove universal composability; in their case the simulator can choose the CRS so that a = b and then obtain both inputs of the sender, something that is needed for proving simulationbased security. However, in our case, we want the receiver to be able to sometimes learn both inputs of the sender. We can therefore utilize this exact property and have the receiver choose s/2 pairs (h 0 , h 1 ) for which a ̸ = b (ensuring that it learns only one input) and s/2 pairs (h 0 , h 1 ) for which a = b (enabling it to learn both inputs by actually running the simulator strategy of [37] ). This therefore provides the exact cut-and-choose property in the OT that is needed. Of course, the receiver must also prove that it behaved in this way. Specifically, it proves in zero-knowledge that s/2 out of s pairs are such that a ̸ = b. We show that this too can be computed at low cost using the technique of Cramer et al. [7] ; see Appendix B.2 for a full description and efficiency analysis of the zero-knowledge protocol.
Background -The OT Protocol of Peikert et al. [37]
Our cut-and-choose oblivious transfer protocol is based on the oblivious transfer of [37] . Their protocol is universally composable in the common reference string model. We present an efficient instantiation of the protocol in the plain model, where there is no common reference string. This protocol is secure against malicious parties, and forms the basis for our protocol. See Protocol 3.2 for a full description.
In order to see that the receiver obtains the correct values in the last step, observe that
Regarding security, if (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) is not a DH tuple, then the receiver can learn only one of the sender's inputs, since in that case one of the two pairs (u 0 , w 0 ), (u 1 , w 1 ) is uniformly distributed and therefore reveals no information about the corresponding input of the sender. This is due to the property of the RAN D function used in Step 4: upon receiving a non-Diffie-Hellman tuple, the output of RAN D is a pair of uniformly and independently distributed group elements. In contrast, if (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) is a DH tuple, and the receiver knows y = log g 0 g 1 , then the receiver can • Inputs: The sender's input is a pair (x 0 , x 1 ) and the receiver's input is a bit σ
• Auxiliary input: Both parties hold a security parameter 1 n and (G, q, g 0 ), where G is an efficient representation of a group of order q with a generator g 0 , and q is of length n.
• The protocol: 
s · (z) t , and the values s, t ← Z q are random.
-S sends the receiver the values (u 0 , w 0 ) where w 0 = v 0 · x 0 , and (u 1 , w 1 ) where
5. The receiver computes
compute both inputs of the server. In order to see this, assume that σ = 0 and so g = (g 0 ) r and h = (h 0 ) r . Then, it can compute x 0 = w 0 /(u 0 ) r as in the protocol. In addition, it can compute
. This works because
Similarly, if σ = 1 then x 1 can be computed as in the protocol and x 0 can be computed as w 0 /(u 0 ) ry . In order to prevent a malicious receiver from doing this, the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 ,
) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple ensures the tuple (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) is not a DH tuple, and so the receiver can only learn a single value of the sender's input.
The proof of security takes advantage of the fact that a simulator can extract R's input-bit σ because it can extract the value α 0 from the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge proven by R. Given α 0 , the simulator can compute α 1 = α 0 + 1 and then check if h = g α 0 (in which case σ = 0) or if h = g α 1 (in which case σ = 1). For simulation in the case that S is corrupted, the simulator sets α 0 = α 1 and cheats in the zero-knowledge proof, enabling it to extract both sender inputs. For the sake of completeness, we present a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for DH tuples in Protocol B.1 in Appendix B.
Exact efficiency. In the OT without the zero-knowledge proof, the sender computes 8 exponentiations and the receiver computes 6. The zero-knowledge proof adds an additional 5 exponentiations for the prover (who is played by the receiver) and 7 for the verifier (who is played by the sender). In addition, the parties exchange 17 group elements (including the zero-knowledge proof), and the protocol takes 6 rounds of communication (3 messages are sent by each party). In summary, there are 26 exponentiations, 17 group elements sent and 6 rounds of communication.
Constructing a Cut-and-Choose OT Protocol
The idea behind the cut-and-choose OT protocol is essentially to run s copies of Protocol 3.2 in parallel, with the following important modification. Instead of requiring that (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) not be a DH tuple in any of the executions, we actually allow the receiver to choose s/2 of the executions in which it can set (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 ) to actually be a DH tuple. This means that in these executions, the receiver obtains both of the sender's inputs. Of course, this must be done without the sender knowing for which of the executions the tuple is of the DH type and for which not. This is achieved by applying the methodology of Cramer et al. [7] for proving a compound statement to the basic DH zero-knowledge proof. The result is surprisingly efficient, and is described in Protocol B.2 in Appendix B. The construction of cut-and-choose OT is described in Protocol 3.3. • Auxiliary input: Both parties hold a security parameter 1 n and (G, q, g 0 ), where G is an efficient representation of a group of order q with a generator g 0 , and q is of length n.
• Setup phase:
1. R chooses a random y ← Z q and sets g 1 = (g 0 ) y .
2. For every j ∈ J , R chooses a random α j ← Z q and computes h • Transfer phase (repeated in parallel for every j):
1. The receiver chooses a random value r j ← Z q and computesg
It sends (g j ,h j ) to the sender.
2. The sender operates in the following way:
s · (z) t , and the values s, t ← Z q are random. 
• Output:
1. For every j (both j ∈ J and j / ∈ J ), the receiver computes
2. For every j ∈ J , the receiver also computes x The security of the protocol is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 If the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the group G, then Protocol 3.3 securely realizes the F ccot functionality in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof: Let A be an adversary that controls R. We construct a simulator S that invokes A on its input and works as follows:
) from A and verifies the zero-knowledge proof as the honest sender would.
(a) If the verification fails, S sends ⊥ to the trusted party computing F ccot and halts.
(b) Otherwise, S runs the extractor that is guaranteed to exist for the proof of knowledge, and extracts a witness set {(i j , α i j )} such that for every i j it holds that h
. S defines the set J to be all of the indices not in the obtained witness set. (Note that when a pair h
is as above, then A can obtain only one of the strings. Thus, the set J of the indices where A receives both strings are those that are not included in this witness set.) (We remark that the above procedure does not guarantee that S runs in expected polynomialtime. Thus, formally S runs the witness-extended emulator of [26] that achieves the above effect.)
For every j /
∈ J , simulator S has obtained α j . S then sets σ j = 0 ifh j = (g j ) α j , and otherwise sets σ j = 1.
4. For every j ∈ J , S sets σ j arbitrarily; say to equal 0. ) to be random elements of G.
S sends all of these values to A and outputs whatever A outputs.
If the extraction of the witness set succeeds whenever A succeeds in proving the zero-knowledge proof, the output of the ideal execution with S is identical to the output of a real execution with A and an honest sender. This is due to the fact that the only difference is with respect to the way the by S yields exactly the same distribution as in a real execution. The proof of this corruption case is concluded by noting that the probability that S does not succeed in extracting a witness when A successfully proves is negligible.
We now proceed to the case that A controls the sender. We construct a simulator S as follows:
1. S computes g 1 = (g 0 ) y for a random y ← Z q , and chooses random values (h
) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple for every j, and sends the values to A.
2. S runs the simulator for the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with the residual A as the verifier.
3. For every j, S computesg j = (g 0 ) r j andh j = (h 0 ) r j and sends the pairs (g j ,h j ) to A. ) values that the honest receiver would receive in a real execution. Second, by the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the output of a simulated execution with S in the ideal model is indistinguishable from the output of a real execution between A and an honest receiver. Formally, we begin with a real execution between the receiver R and A. Then, we modify R to be a simulator S 1 that works exactly as R does except that instead of honestly proving the zero-knowledge proof, it runs the simulator instead. By the zero-knowledge property, the outcome of the two executions is indistinguishable. Next, we modify S 1 to S 2 by having S 2 work in the same way except that it generates all of the h
The fact that these executions are indistinguishable is due to the DDH assumption. In particular, since the receiver only uses the knowledge of α j to prove the zero-knowledge proof, both S 1 and S 2 can run their executions without knowing the α j values at all, and even when they receive all of the h j 0 , h j 1 values as external input. A direct reduction to the DDH problem is then straightforward, and is thus omitted. Finally, we modify S 2 to S 3 who instead of outputting the values as the receiver would compute them, it extracts the pair (x j 0 , x j 1 ) as the simulator S would and sets the receiver's output to be x j σ j . Since S extracts the values in the same way as the honest receiver, this makes no difference to the output. Finally, we modify S 3 to S 4 by having it computeg j = (g 0 ) r j andh j = (h 0 ) r j irrespective of the real input σ j . The output distribution generated by S 4 is indistinguishable to that generated by S 3 by another direct reduction to the DDH problem. We conclude by noting that the distribution generated by S 4 is identical to that generated by S in an ideal execution; specifically, it makes no difference if (x Exact efficiency. The setup phase requires 2s + 1 exponentiations and the exchange of 2s + 1 group elements, plus the zero-knowledge proof that adds an additional 7s + 4 exponentiations and 3s + 4 group elements sent; see Appendix B.2. Overall, the setup requires 9s + 5 exponentiations and the exchange of 5s + 5 group elements. The transfer phase requires 11.5s exponentiations and the exchange of 6s group elements. Finally, the number of rounds remains unchanged at 6. In summary, there are 20.5s + 5 exponentiations, 11s + 5 group elements sent and 6 rounds of communication.
Single-Choice Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer
The protocol for achieving the single-choice cut-and-choose OT functionality F S ccot implements the functionality that is defined formally in Figure 3 .1; an intuitive description is provided in Figure 3 .5. (
An example where j ∈ J and σ = 0.
The protocol F S ccot is achieved by modifying Protocol 3.3 above in Step 1 of the transfer phase so that the receiver R proves that it used the same σ in every tuple. In order to enable this proof to be carried out efficiently, we modify Step 1 of the transfer phase of Protocol 3.3 as follows:
The receiver chooses a (single) random value r ← Z q and computes
. . , h s ) to the sender, and proves in zero-knowledge that it computed this correctly.
The required zero-knowledge proof is that there exists an r ∈ Z q such that either g ′ = (g 0 ) r and
are Diffie-Hellman tuples. Thus, the zero-knowledge proof of Protocol B.4 in Appendix B.3 can be used at the exact additional cost of s+18 exponentiations and the exchange of 10 group elements (no additional rounds are needed because this proof can be carried out in parallel to the proof in the setup phase). By the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof, R must use the same σ in every transfer. The other difference in the protocol is that instead of sending a different (g j , h j ) pair for every j, the receiver sends a single value g ′ . In the proof below, we show that this does not leak any information to the sender.
Proposition 3.6 If the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the group G, then the modified protocol for single-choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer, securely realizes the F S
ccot functionality in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof:
The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.4, except for the following modification. When analyzing the case that the adversary controls the sender, the proof of Proposition 3.4 describes a sequence of simulators S 1 , . . . , S 4 , which replace the operation of the receiver. We use the same simulators except for simulator S 4 . This simulator now replaces the message (
, regardless of the value of σ. It must be shown that the distributions of these two messages are indistinguishable by the sender. Note that the sender also receives the values of the set S = (g 0 , g 1 
In the original protocol, h j 1 can also be equal to (g 1 ) α j +1 , but in simulators S 2 and S 3 the input distribution is as we describe here.)
Reordering the items in S, we can define it as S = S 0 ∪ S 1 where 
Batch Single-Choice Cut-and-Choose OT
In our protocol we need to carry out cut-and-choose oblivious transfers for all wires in the circuit. Furthermore, it is crucial that the subset of indices for which the receiver obtains both pairs is the same in all transfers. We call a functionality that achieves this "batch single-choice cut-and-choose OT" and denote it F S,B
ccot . The functionality is formally defined in Figure 3 .7, and an example is given in Figure 3 .8. 
An example where j ∈ J and σ i = 0.
In order to realize this functionality it suffices to run the setup phase of Protocol 3.3 once, and then the transfer phase of the protocol with single choice ℓ times in parallel (with receiver inputs σ 1 , . . . , σ ℓ where σ i is the receiver's choice in execution i). This ensures that the same set J is used in all transfers, since J depends only on the values sent in the setup phase. We remark that parallel composition holds here because the simulation only rewinds in the transfer phase for the zero-knowledge protocol, and Protocol B.2 that forms the basis of the zero-knowledge proof is zero-knowledge under parallel composition (as stated in Proposition B.3).
Proposition 3.9 Assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G, the abovedescribed protocol securely realizes F S,B
ccot in the presence of malicious adversaries. Exact efficiency. The setup phase here remains the same, and including the zero-knowledge costs 9s + 5 exponentiations and the exchange of 5s + 5 group elements. The transfer phase is repeated ℓ times, where each transfer incurs a cost of 11.5s + 19 exponentiations and the exchange of 5s + 11 group elements. We conclude that there are 11.5sℓ + 19ℓ + 9s + 5 exponentiations, 5sℓ + 11ℓ + 5s + 5 group elements sent and 6 rounds of communication. In Section 4.4 we observe that 9.5sℓ of the exponentiations are "fixed-base" and thus this can actually be reduced to the equivalent of 5.166sℓ exponentiations.
The Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation
Protocol Description
Before describing the protocol in detail, we first present an intuitive explanation of the different steps, and their purpose:
Step 1: P 1 constructs s copies of a Yao garbled circuit for computing the function. The keys (garbled values) on the wires of the s copies of the circuit are all random, except for the keys corresponding to P 1 's input wires, which are chosen in a special way. [34] , and therefore if some of the keys are revealed, the remaining keys remain pseudorandom.) 2 The actual symmetric keys used are derived from the g
·r j values using a randomness extractor; a universal
Step 2: The parties execute batch single-choice cut-and-choose OT. P 1 inputs the key-pairs for all wires associated with P 2 's input, and P 2 inputs its input and a random set J ⊂ [s] of size s/2. The result is that P 2 learns all the keys on the wires associated with its own input for s/2 of the circuits as indexed by J (called check circuits), and in addition learns the keys corresponding to its actual input in these wires in the remaining circuits (called evaluation circuits).
Step 3: P 1 sends P 2 the garbled circuits, and the values
. . . , g rs which are commitments to all the keys on the wires associated with P 1 's input. At this stage P 1 is fully committed to all s circuits, but does not yet know which circuits are to be opened.
Step 4: P 2 reveals to P 1 its choice of check circuits and proves that this was indeed its choice by sending both values on the wire associated with P 2 's first input bit in each check circuit. Note that P 2 can know both these values only for circuits that are check circuits.
Step 5: To completely decrypt the check circuits in order to check that they were correctly constructed, P 2 also needs to obtain all the keys on the wires associated with P 1 's input. Therefore, if the jth circuit is a check circuit, P 1 sends r j to P 2 . Given all of the g a 0 i , g a 1 i values and r j , P 2 can compute all of the keys g a 0 i ·r j , g a 1 i ·r j in the jth circuit by itself (and P 1 cannot change the values). Furthermore, this reveals nothing about the keys in the evaluation circuits.
Step 6: Given all of the keys on all of the input wires, P 2 checks the validity of the s/2 check circuits. This ensures that P 2 will catch P 1 with high probability if many of the garbled circuits generated by P 1 do not compute the correct function. Thus, unless P 2 detects cheating, it is assured that a majority of the evaluation circuits are correct.
Step 7: All that remains is for P 1 to send P 2 the keys associated with its actual input, and then P 2 will be able to compute the evaluation circuits. This raises a problem as to how P 2 can be sure that P 1 sends keys that correspond to the same input in all circuits. This brings us to the way that P 1 chose these keys (via the Diffie-Hellman pseudorandom synthesizer). Specifically, for every wire i and evaluation-circuit j, party P 1 sends P 2 the value g a
i ·r j where x i is the ith bit of P 1 's input. P 1 then proves in zero-knowledge that the same a
i exponent appears in all of the values sent. Essentially, this is a proof that the values constitute an "extended" Diffie-Hellman tuple and thus this statement can be proven very efficiently.
Step 8: Finally, given the keys associated with P 1 's inputs and its own inputs, P 2 evaluates the evaluation circuits and obtains their output values. Recall, however, that the checks above only guarantee that a majority of the circuits are correct, and not that all of them are. Therefore, P 2 outputs the value that is output from the majority of the evaluation circuits. We stress that if P 2 sees different outputs in different circuits, and thus knows for certain that P 1 has tried to cheat, it must ignore this observation and output the majority value (or otherwise it might leak information to P 1 , as in the example described in Section 1.2).
hash function suffices for this [6, 18] . The only subtlety is that P1 must be fully committed to the garbled circuits, including these symmetric keys, before it knows which circuits are to be checked. However, randomness extractors are not 1-1 functions. This is solved by having P1 send the seed for the extractor before Step 4 below. Observe that the {g
, g r j } values and the seed for the extractor fully determine the symmetric keys, as required.
PROTOCOL 4.1 (Computing f (x, y))
Inputs: P1 has input x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and P2 has input y ∈ {0, 1} ℓ .
Auxiliary input: a statistical security parameter s, the description of a circuit C such that C(x, y) = f (x, y), and (G, q, g) where G is a cyclic group with generator g and prime order q, and q is of length n.
The protocol:
1. Input key choice and circuit preparation: 
where H is a suitable randomness extractor [6, 18] ; see also [10] .
(c) P1 constructs s independent copies of a garbled circuit of C, denoted GC1, . . . , GCs, using random keys except for wires w1, . . . , w ℓ for which the keys are as above; see Appendix A. (c) P2 receives all the keys associated with its input wires in all circuits GCj for j ∈ J , and receives the keys associated with its input y on its input wires in all other circuits.
3. Send circuits and commitments: P1 sends P2 the garbled circuits (i.e., the gate and output tables), the "seed" for the randomness extractor H, and the following "commitment" to the garbled values associated with P1's input wires:
4. Send cut-and-choose challenge: P2 sends P1 the set J along with the pair of keys associated with its first input bit y1 in every circuit GCj for j ∈ J . If the values received by P1 are incorrect, it outputs ⊥ and aborts. Circuits GCj for j ∈ J are called check-circuits, and for j / ∈ J are called evaluation-circuits.
5.
Send all input garbled values in check-circuits: For every check-circuit GCj, party P1 sends the value rj to P2, and P2 checks that these are consistent with the pairs {(j, g r j )}j∈J received in Step 3. If not, P2 aborts outputting ⊥. 
·r j ) associated with P1's input in GCj. In addition it sets the garbled values associated with its own input in GCj to be as obtained in the cut-and-choose OT. Given all the garbled values for all input wires in GCj, party P2 decrypts the circuit and verifies that it is a garbled version of C. If there exists a circuit for which this does not hold, then P2 aborts and outputs ⊥.
P1 sends its garbled input values in the evaluation-circuits:
(a) P1 sends the keys associated with its inputs in the evaluation circuits: For every j / ∈ J and every wire i = 1, . . . , ℓ, party P1 sends the value k 8. Circuit evaluation: P2 uses the keys associated with P1's input obtained in Step 7a and the keys associated with its own input obtained in Step 2c to evaluate the evaluation circuits GCj for every j / ∈ J . If a circuit decryption fails, then P2 sets the output of that circuit to be ⊥. Party P2 takes the output that appears in most circuits, and outputs it.
Proof of Security
Before providing the full proof of security, we give some intuition regarding the security of the protocol. We first show that the selective failure attack discussed in [24, 29] cannot be carried out here. The concern there was that P 1 would use correct keys for all of P 2 's input bits when opening the check circuit, but would use incorrect keys in some of the oblivious transfers. This is problematic because if P 1 input incorrect keys for the zero value of P 2 's first input bit, and correct keys for all other values, then P 2 would not detect any misbehavior if its first input bit equals 1. However, if its first input bit equals 0 then it would have to abort (because it would not be able to decrypt any of the evaluation circuits). This results in P 1 learning P 2 's first input bit with probability 1. In order to solve this problem in [29] it was necessary to split P 2 's input bits into random shares, thereby increasing the size of the input to the circuit and the size of the circuit itself. In contrast, this attack does not arise here at all because P 2 obtains all of the keys associated with its input bits in the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer, and the values are not sent separately for check and evaluation circuits. Thus, if P 1 attempts a similar attack here for a small number of circuits then it will not be the majority and so does not matter, and if it does so for a large number of circuits then it will be caught with overwhelming probability.
Observe also that in Steps 3-5 P 2 checks that half of the circuits, the check circuits, and their corresponding input garbled values, were correctly constructed. This is done by first having P 1 commit to all circuits and then having P 2 choosing half of them. P 2 is therefore assured that with high probability the majority of the remaining circuits, and their input garbled values, are also correct. Consequently, the result output by the majority of the remaining circuits must be correct.
The security of the protocol is expressed in the following theorem: 
Proof:
We prove Theorem 4.2 in a hybrid model where a trusted party is used to compute the batch single-choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer functionality and the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of Step 7b. We separately prove the case that P 1 is corrupted and the case that P 2 is corrupted.
P 1 is corrupted. Intuitively, P 1 can only cheat by constructing some of the circuits in an incorrect way. However, in order for this to influence the outcome of the computation, it has to be that a majority of the evaluation circuits, or equivalently over one quarter of them, are incorrect. Furthermore, it must hold that none of these incorrect circuits are check circuits. The reason why this bad event occurs with such small probability is that P 1 is committed to the circuits before it learns which circuits are check circuits and which are evaluation circuits. In order to see this, observe that in the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer, P 2 receives all of the keys associated with its own input wires for the check circuits in J (while P 1 knows nothing about J ). Furthermore, P 1 sends all of the {(i, 0, g a 0 i ), (i, 1, g a 1 i )} and {(j, g r j } values, and the garbled circuit tables, before learning J . Thus, it can only succeed in cheating if it successfully guesses over s/4 circuits which all happen to not be in J . As we will show, this occurs with probability of approximately 2 −s/4 . (Recall also that P 1 is required to prove that all its inputs to the evaluation circuits are consistent, and therefore changing the circuits is its only option to changing the computed functionality.) We remark that it is also crucial that if P 2 aborts by detecting cheating by P 1 , then this occurs independently of P 2 's input. However, this follows immediately from the protocol description. We now proceed to the formal proof.
Let A be an adversary controlling P 1 in an execution of Protocol 4.1 where a trusted party is used to compute the cut-and-choose OT functionality F
S,B
ccot and the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of Step 7b. We construct a simulator S who runs in the ideal model with a trusted party computing f . S runs A internally and simulates the honest P 2 for A as well as the trusted party computing the oblivious transfer and zero-knowledge functionalities. In addition, S interacts externally with the trusted party computing f . S works as follows:
1. S invokes A upon its input and auxiliary input and receives the inputs that A sends to the trusted party computing the cut-and-choose OT functionality. These inputs constitute an n × s matrix of pairs {(z
. . , n and j = 1, . . . , s. 4. S receives the set {r j } j∈J from A, and checks that for every j ∈ J it holds that h j = g r j . If not, it sends ⊥ to the trusted party, simulates P 2 aborting, and outputs whatever A outputs.
S receives from
5. S verifies that all garbled circuits GC j for j ∈ J are correctly constructed (it does this in the same way that an honest P 2 would). If not, it sends ⊥ to the trusted party, simulates P 2 aborting, and outputs whatever A outputs.
6. S receives keys k ′ i,j from A, for every j / ∈ J and i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
7. S receives the witnesses that S sends to the trusted party computing the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality of Step 7b. Thus, for every i = 1, . . . , ℓ, S receives a value a i such that k ′ i,j = (h j ) a i for every j / ∈ J , and either u 0 i = g a i or u 1 i = g a i (this is the witness).
(a) If for some i, S does not receive a valid witness, then it sends ⊥ to the trusted party, simulates P 2 aborting, and outputs whatever A outputs. where |x| = |y|. (Note that here we prove (n, s)-indistinguishability, and so the probability of distinguishing must be at most µ(n) + 2 −O(s) for some negligible function µ.) We begin by defining the notion of a bad circuit. For a garbled circuit GC j we define the circuit input keys as follows:
Circuit input keys associated with
be the values sent by P 1 to P 2 in Step 3 of the protocol. Then, the circuit input keys associated with P 1 Before proceeding, we stress that all of the above circuit keys are fully determined after Step 3 of the protocol, as are the garbled circuits GC j . This is because P 1 sends the {g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g r j } values, the garbled circuits and the seed to the randomness extractor in this step (note that once the seed to the randomness extractor is fixed, the symmetric keys derived from the Diffie-Hellman values are fully determined). Now, simply stated, a garbled circuit GC j is bad if the circuit keys associated with both P 1 's and P 2 's input do not open it to the correct circuit C. We stress again that after
Step 3 of the protocol, each circuit is either "bad" or "not bad", and this is fully determined.
Our aim is now to bound the probability that P 2 does not abort and yet the majority of the evaluation circuits are bad. In order to do this, note first that the set J is completely hidden in an information-theoretic sense from P 1 until Step 4 of the protocol (this holds in an informationtheoretic sense in the hybrid model where a trusted party computes the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer, which is the model in which we carry out our analysis). Thus, for the sake of computing the probabilities we can consider the case that J is chosen randomly after Step 3. Now, let badMaj denote the event that at least s/4 of the garbled circuits are bad, and let noAbort denote the event that P 2 does not abort in Step 6 of the protocol. We now bound the probability of the event that both badMaj and noAbort occur. 
Claim 4.3 For every s ∈ N it holds that
Pr[noAbort ∧ badTotal = i]
because if badTotal > s/2 then P 2 always aborts, and if badTotal < s 4 then badMaj is false. Recall that |J | = s/2 and so if i circuits are bad and no abort takes place, then it must be that s/2 of the s − i not-bad circuits were chosen to be checked. Thus,
where the second last equality is due to the fact that for i < s/2 it holds that ( i s/2 ) = 0, and the last equality can be found in [17, Page 174] . We now bound this last value:
) .
Letting t = s/4, we have that the above equals (2) completing the first part of the claim. We now proceed to the second part by using approximations that hold for values of s that are not too small. (Note that the above bound is quite wasteful because t+2 3t+2 is close to 1/3 and we bounded it by 1/2.) Writing
Now, for every i < t it holds that
we have:
Putting the above together we have that
where the second "approximate equality" is just due to removing the value in the square-root (which equals exactly √ 3/8) and some "+1" terms. Recalling that t = s/4 we conclude that
completing the proof of the claim.
We stress that the approximate bound is significantly better than 2 −s/4 . In particular, in order to obtain security of 2 −40 , it suffices to set s = 128 rather than s = 160 (based on the fact that 0.311 × 128 = 39.81). Nevertheless, we proved the exact bound that holds for all s in order to later analyze a covert version of our protocol; see Section 5.2. Finally, before proceeding with the proof we remark that we checked the accuracy of this approximation by calculating the exact result. For s = 128 we have that ( 3s
which is very close to what we expect. We stress that for an error of 2 −40 using the exact bound, we have that s must actually be set to 132.
We now use Claim 4.3 to prove that the result of an ideal-model execution with S is (n, s)-indistinguishable from a real execution of the protocol with adversary A. Specifically, we claim that as long as the event (noAbort ∧ badMaj) does not occur, the result of the ideal and hybrid executions (where the oblivious transfer and zero-knowledge are ideal) are identically distributed. In order to see this, observe that if less than s/4 circuits are bad, then the majority of circuits evaluated by P 2 compute the correct circuit C which in turn computes f . In addition, by the ideal zero-knowledge and the fact that the g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g r j values fully determine the garbled values associated with P 1 's input bits, the input x derived by the simulator S and sent to the trusted party computing f corresponds exactly to the input x in the computation of every not-bad garbled circuit GC j . Thus, in every not-bad circuit P 2 outputs f (x, y), and these are a majority of the evaluation circuits. We conclude that as long as an abort does not occur, P 2 outputs f (x, y) in both the real and ideal executions, and this corresponds exactly to the view of A in the executions. Finally, we observe that S sends ⊥ to the trusted party whenever P 2 would abort and output ⊥. (One subtlety to note is that an honest P 2 also outputs ⊥ if circuit decryption fails for a majority of the evaluation circuits. However, this can only occur in the event of noAbort ∧ badMaj which we are assuming does not occur.) This completes the proof of this corruption case. P 2 is corrupted. The intuition behind the security in this corruption case is simple. P 2 receives s/2 opened check circuits and s/2 evaluation circuits. For each of the evaluation circuits it receives only a single set of keys for decrypting the circuit. Furthermore, the keys that it receives for each of the s/2 evaluation circuits are associated with the same pair of inputs x and y. Regarding x, this is due to the fact that P 1 is honest. Regarding y, this is due to the fact that the oblivious transfer enforces "single choice" for the receiver. The above implies that P 2 can do nothing but decrypt s/2 circuits, where in each it obtains the same value f (x, y) and learns nothing else. We stress one subtlety which is due to the fact that P 2 can try and send P 1 a different set J ′ to the set J that it input to the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer. If it succeeds in doing this, then there will be at least one evaluation circuit for which P 2 knows all of the keys associated with its input wires. In such a case, it could compute f (x, y) for multiple values of y, and thus learn more than allowed about x. However, in order to successfully do this, a corrupt P 2 must send P 1 both of the keys associated with the input bit y 1 for a circuit GC j where j / ∈ J . Since both of these keys are random, and P 2 only learns one of them in the oblivious transfer (in the hybrid model the other key is completely unknown), it follows that it succeeds in doing this with only negligible probability. We now proceed to the formal proof.
Let A be an adversary controlling P 2 in an execution of Protocol 4.1 where a trusted party is used to compute the cut-and-choose OT functionality F
S,B
ccot and the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of Step 7b. We construct a simulator S for the ideal model with a trusted party computing f as follows: 4. For every j ∈ J , S constructs GC j as a correct garbled circuit, in the same way that an honest P 1 would construct it.
S invokes A upon its input and auxiliary input and receives the inputs that
5. For every j / ∈ J , S uses Lemma A.1 to construct a fake garbled circuit GC j which always outputs z (where z is the output that S received from the trusted party). The keys associated with P 1 's inputs in these fake garbled circuits are consistent with the g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g r j values, as an honest party would use them. (c) Otherwise, S proceeds as below.
S hands
A the values {r j } j∈J , where r j is as chosen above.
9. S hands A the keys k ′ i,j = g a 0 i ·r j for every j / ∈ J and i = 1, . . . , ℓ, and proves in zero-knowledge that all these keys are consistent with a single input. (Observe that these are the keys that A expects to receive in Step 7a of the protocol. However, instead of being the keys corresponding to x -which S does not know -they are the zero keys.) 10. After concluding, S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
Denoting Protocol 4.1, we now show that for every A corrupting P 2 and every s it holds that { ideal f,S (x, y, z, n, s)
where |x| = |y|. (Note that here we prove standard indistinguishability in n, that holds for all values of s. That is, the value of s has no effect on the ability to distinguish.) We first remark that the probability that S outputs fail is negligible because for every j / ∈ J the adversary A receives only one of x 0 1,j , x 1 1,j and these are random keys (note that the garbled circuits contain encryptions under these keys; however, by the security of encryption the probability that such a key can be obtained is negligible). We therefore ignore this event from now on and show that the ideal and real distributions are computationally indistinguishable conditioned on the event not happening.
Observe that the only difference with respect to A's view between the simulation and a real execution is regarding the construction of the garbled circuits GC j for j / ∈ J : in the simulation these are fake garbled circuits GC j outputting z (as received from the trusted party) and in the real execution these are real garbled circuits GC j computing f (x, y). Thus, by Lemma A.1 indistinguishability follows as long as in a real execution A obtains the garbled values corresponding to x for P 1 's input wires and to y for P 2 's input wires, where z = f (x, y). Regarding y, this follows directly from the fact that S defines y to be the values σ 1 · · · σ ℓ which define exactly which garbled values A receives from the oblivious transfers. However, the case for x is more problematic since A receives all of the g a 0 i , g a 1 i , g r j values which fully determine the garbled values corresponding to all of P 1 's input wires. We therefore first modify S to S ′ so that in every GC j for j / ∈ J , S ′ uses g a 0 i ·r j to derive the value k ′ i,j that S hands A in Step 9 of the simulation, but uses a completely random value for the other key on that wire. The indistinguishability of these two simulations follows via a straightforward reduction to the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Once the simulation is with the modified S ′ we can apply Lemma A.1 and complete the proof. (Formally a hybrid argument is required for this step because here there are s/2 fake garbled circuits whereas Lemma A.1 refers to a single fake garbled circuit. Nevertheless observing that indistinguishability must hold even given x and y, this is a completely standard hybrid argument and so is omitted.) We stress that in order for the proof to hold, it must be that in every evaluation circuit A learns the garbled value associated with the same bit, for every input wire associated with P 2 's input. However, this is guaranteed by the security of the single-choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer. This completes the proof.
Exact Efficiency
An analysis of the protocol yields the following number of exponentiations: (1) 2sℓ + s + 2ℓ for the input-key preparation and commitments to the g a and g r values in Step 1, (2) 11.5sℓ + 19ℓ + 9s + 5 for the oblivious transfer of Step 2 (see analysis in Section 3.5), (3) sℓ for P 2 to recompute in Step 6 the input keys associated with P 1 's input, and (4) sℓ/2 + 18ℓ for the 2ℓ proofs of consistency for P 1 's input bits in Step 7 (see analysis in Appendix B.3). Overall, we have 15sℓ + 39ℓ + 10s + 5 exponentiations.
Regarding the bandwidth, a similar count yields the exchange of 7sℓ + 22ℓ + 7s + 5 group elements and s copies of the garbled circuit. Finally, the protocol takes 12 rounds of communication (including the oblivious transfer and zero-knowledge proof). We conclude that there are 15sℓ + 39ℓ + 10s + 5 exponentiations, 7sℓ + 22ℓ + 7s + 5 group elements sent and 12 rounds of communication. In addition, there are 6.5|C|s symmetric encryptions, comprised of 4|C|s encryptions for constructing all s garbled circuits, 4|C|0.5s encryptions for P 2 to check s/2 of them, and |C|0.5s encryptions for P 2 to compute the s/2 evaluation circuits. Finally, there are 4|C|s ciphertexts sent for transmitting these circuits.
We stress that this analysis describes the overhead of the basic protocol. The overhead can be substantially improved by different optimizations, as shown in Section 4.4 below.
Optimizations
Fixed-base exponentiations. Exponentiations are commonly computed by repeated squaring, which for a group of order q of length n bits requires on average 1.5n multiplications for a full exponentiation. If multiple exponentiations of the same base are computed, then the repeated binary powers of the base can be computed once for all exponentiations, reducing the amortized overhead of an exponentiation on average to 0.5n multiplications (see [31] , 14.6.3). Let us examine how this affects the overhead of the protocol (taking into account only the sℓ component of the overhead, which is the most significant): (1) P 1 preparing its input keys in Step 1 requires 2sℓ exponentiations which are fixed base. Their amortized overhead is therefore equivalent to that of about 2/3sℓ exponentiations. (2) Of the 11.5sℓ exponentiations of the batch single-choice cutand-choose OT of Step 2, 10.5sℓ exponentiations are performed with fixed bases (these are the exponentiations in the RAND operation, the computation of h j by the receiver and half of the exponentiations in the zero-knowledge protocol in the transfer phase of the single-choice cut-andchoose oblivious transfer). Therefore the amortized overhead is equivalent to that of about (10.5/3+ 1)sℓ = 4.5sℓ exponentiations. (3) In Step 6, P 2 uses sℓ exponentiations to compute P 1 's input keys in check circuits. They are all fixed base and therefore are equivalent to about sℓ/3 exponentiations. (4) P 1 proving the consistency of its inputs in Step 7 takes about sℓ/2 exponentiations which are all fixed base. They are therefore equivalent to sℓ/6 full exponentiations. The overall overhead of the exponentiations is therefore equivalent to that of about 5.66sℓ full exponentiations.
Reducing the computation of P 2 in Step 6. In Step 6 of Protocol 4.1, P 2 performs sℓ exponentiations in order to compute the garbled values associated with P 1 's input in the check circuits. Namely, given the (i, 0, g a 0 i ), (i, 1, g a 1 i ) tuples and r j for every j ∈ J , party P 2 computes g a 0 i ·r j , g a 1 i ·r j for all i = 1 . . . ℓ and j ∈ J . This step costs sℓ exponentiations (2ℓ exponentiations for each of the s/2 check circuits). As we will see, we can reduce this to about a quarter by having P 1 send the g a 0 i ·r j , g a 1 i ·r j values to P 2 and prove that they are correct (not in zero-knowledge). We remark that P 1 has to compute these values in order to construct the circuit and so this results in no additional computation overhead by P 1 (the only addition is in communication bandwidth).
The protocol is modified by changing Step 6 as follows (recall that P 2 already has all of the (i, 0, g a 0 i ), (i, 1, g a 1 i ) tuples and r j values):
. . , ℓ and j ∈ J .
P 2 chooses random values γ
3. For every j ∈ J , party P 2 computes the following two values
Note that computing α j requires only a single full exponentiation since the value (g a 0
4. P 2 accepts P 1 's input if and only if α j = β j for all j ∈ J .
We first prove that this method is secure:
Claim 4.4 The probability that P 2 accepts if there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and j ∈ J such that
Proof: Assume there exists an i * ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and j ∈ J such that
which in turn holds if and only if
Assume now that g
Equality holds if and only if
Fixing all of the γ values first, and then choosing γ 0 i * at random, we have that this holds with probability at most 2 −L . (Note that this assumes that g a 0 i * ·r j /k ′ 0 i * ,j is a generator. However, in a group of prime order, all elements apart from the unity are generators.) Applying the union bound for all j ∈ J we obtain the claim.
We now analyze the efficiency improvement gained by this method. The communication overhead is slightly increased over the basic version of the protocol, since sℓ values, namely all garbled values of P 1 's inputs in the check circuits, are sent. This is not significant when the circuit is not very small. Regarding the computation overhead, we have that P 2 now has to perform sℓ exponentiations in order to compute the β j values (2ℓ exponentiations for s/2 values of j) with an exponent which is only L bits long. (Unfortunately, these exponentiations are not fixed base.) Assuming that exponentiations are carried out in an elliptic curve group of order 2 160 and that L = 40, we have that the cost of the exponentiations is reduced by a factor of 4. Thus, instead of sℓ exponentiations, we effectively have sℓ/4 exponentiations. This is a mild improvement over the sℓ/3 cost when using the fixed-base optimization.
Preprocessing. The bulk of the exponentiations performed in the protocol can be precomputed.
Step 1 of the protocol, where P 1 computes its input keys, can clearly be computed before P 1 receives its inputs.
Step 2 executes the oblivious transfers. It can be slightly changed to be run before P 2 receives its inputs: P 2 can execute this step with random inputs σ 1 , . . . , σ ℓ . Then, when it receives its input bits y 1 , . . . , y ℓ , it sends P 1 a string of correction bits y 1 ⊕ σ 1 , . . . , y ℓ ⊕ σ ℓ . P 1 exchanges the roles of the two keys of input wires of P 2 for which it receives a correction bit with the value 1.
(The security proof can be easily adapted for this variant of the protocol.) Given this change, both Steps 1 and 2 can be precomputed. These steps account for 13.5sℓ of the 15sℓ exponentiations of the protocol, where the remaining 1.5sℓ exponentiations are fixed base. This means that if preprocessing is used, then after receiving their inputs the parties need to effectively compute only sℓ/2 full exponentiations. Similarly, in each transfer phase the sender can send its messages to the receiver one by one, as it computes them. The receiver can begin decrypting the first message immediately as it arrives, in parallel to the sender computing the following messages.
Bandwidth vs. Computation
It was shown in [16] that it is possible to reduce the bandwidth of sending the circuits by about 50%, in the following way: P 1 generates each circuit as a deterministic function of a different seed; P 1 first commits to the circuits, and then, instead of sending the tables of check circuits, it only sends the seeds from which these circuits were computed. This reduction in communication comes at the cost of P 2 having to generate long pseudo-random strings from seeds, and repeating P 1 's task of generating the circuits. This optimization might be useful, though, in settings in which communication is expensive (e.g., for a roaming cellular user).
Variants -Universal Composability and Covert Adversaries
Universally Composable Two-Party Computation
We observe that the simulators in the proof of Theorem 4.2 carry out no rewinding, and likewise the intermediate simulators used to prove the reductions. Thus, if the protocols used to compute the batch cut-and-choose oblivious transfer functionality and the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of
Step 7b are universally composable, then so is Protocol 4.1. Furthermore, the protocol for computing the oblivious transfer is universally composable if the zero-knowledge proof carried out by the receiver in the setup phase is universally composable. Both that proof and the proof of Step 7b are essentially the proof of Protocol B.2. Thus, all we need is a universally composable variant of the zero-knowledge proof of Protocol B.2 and the entire protocol is universally composable. In order to do this, we need an efficient transformation from Σ protocols to universally composable zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge. Efficient constructions of universally composable zero-knowledge have been considered in [12, 30, 9] , but do not work efficiently for all Σ protocols. Another approach was presented recently in [20] . We use this protocol, and for the sake of completeness (and to facilitate an exact complexity analysis) we present it in Appendix C. As we will see below, the cost of the exponentiations is dominated by 2s 2 Diffie-Hellman group exponentiations. We summarize the above in the following theorem (the number of rounds is fewer here because the zero-knowledge protocol has fewer rounds in the model of universal composability): Efficiency of the UC variant of protocol 4.1. We begin by translating the above into the cost of running a universally composable zero-knowledge protocol for subset DH tuples (see Protocol B.2). However, note that we only need to obtain security of 2 −s/4 and therefore we use L = s/4 in the transformation of Appendix C. Now, the number of exponentiations in the s/2 out of s variant Protocol B.2 without the verifier commitment (because we only need the basic Σ protocol portion of it) is exactly 7s. As we have seen in Appendix C, the cost of converting this to a universally-composable zero-knowledge protocol, using the UC commitment scheme of [27] , is L times the cost of the Σ protocol plus 57L group exponentiations. Thus, with L = s/4 we have that the zero-knowledge protocols costs 7sL + 57L = · s + 18sℓ group exponentiations, beyond the cost of the basic version that is only secure in the stand-alone model. Although this is certainly not "for free" it is not overly prohibitive. We remark that the universally composable zero-knowledge proofs require three rounds of communication, rather than five rounds for the stand-alone versions. Since two of these are run at separate phases, we have that this takes four rounds off the round complexity of Protocol 4.1, yielding a total of 8 rounds.
Covert Security
In the model of security in the presence of covert adversaries [1] , the requirement is that any cheating by an adversary will be caught with some probability ϵ. The value of ϵ taken depends on the application, the ramifications to an adversary being caught, the value to an adversary when it cheats successfully (if not caught) and so on. The analysis of our protocol shows that for every value of s (even if s is very small) the probability that an adversary can cheat without being caught is at most 2 +1 ; see Claim 4.3 and a discussion below. This immediately yields a protocol that is secure in the presence of covert adversaries, as stated in the following theorem. 
+1 .
We stress that our protocol is significantly more efficient than the protocols of [1] and [16] when values of ϵ that are greater than 1/2 are desired. For example, in order to obtain an ϵ-deterrent of 0.99, the protocol of [1] requires using 100 garbled circuits. However, taking s = 30 in our protocol here yields an ϵ-deterrent of about 0.99, and so it suffices to send 30 circuits and not 100, reducing the cost by more than a factor of 3.
A tighter analysis. As we saw in the proof of Claim 4.3, the probability of cheating is actually significantly lower than 2 −s/4+1 . For small values of s the exact probability of cheating, given in Claim 4.3, is ( 3s/4 + 1
) . Based on this formula, with s = 24 we obtain an ϵ-deterrent of 0.99, and so the cost is actually less than 1/4 of the protocol of [1] , which is very significant.
A Yao's Protocol -Semi-Honest Adversaries
We describe here the construction of secure two-party computation (for semi-honest adversaries) which is described in [41] . This construction is based on Yao construction. It is proved in [28] to be secure against semi-honest adversaries. Let C be a Boolean circuit that receives two inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and outputs C(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ (for simplicity, we assume that the input length, output length and the security parameter are all of the same length ℓ). We also assume that C has the property that if a circuit-output wire comes from a gate g, then gate g has no wires that are input to other gates. 3 (Likewise, if a circuit-input wire is itself also a circuit-output, then it is not input into any gate.)
We begin by describing the construction of a single garbled gate g in C. The circuit C is Boolean, and therefore any gate is represented by a function g : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1}. Now, let the two input wires to g be labeled w 1 and w 2 , and let the output wire from g be labeled
be six keys obtained by independently invoking the keygeneration algorithm G(1 ℓ ); for simplicity, assume that these keys are also of length ℓ. Intuitively, we wish to be able to compute k
, without revealing any of the other three values k
. The gate g is defined by the following four values
where E is from a private key encryption scheme (G, E, D) that has indistinguishable encryptions for multiple messages, and has an elusive efficiently verifiable range. Informally, this means (1) that for any two (known) messages x and y, no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of x and y, and (2) that there is a negligible probability that an encryption under one key falls into the range of encryptions under another key, and given a key k it is easy to verify whether a certain ciphertext is in the range of encryptions with k. See [28] for a detailed discussion of these properties, and for examples of easy implementations satisfying them. For example, the encryption scheme could be E k (m) = ⟨r, f k (r) ⊕ m0 n ⟩, where f k is a pseudo-random function keyed by k whose output is |m| + n bits long, and r is a randomly chosen value. Now, the actual gate is defined by a random permutation of the above values, denoted as c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ; from here on we call them the garbled table of gate g. Notice that given k α 1 and k . Later we will show that except with negligible probability, only one non-⊥ value is indeed obtained.)
We are now ready to show how to construct the entire garbled circuit. Let m be the number of wires in the circuit C, and let w 1 , . . . , w m be labels of these wires. These labels are all chosen uniquely with the following exception: if w i and w j are both output wires from the same gate g, then w i = w j (this occurs if the fan-out of g is greater than one). Likewise, if an input bit enters more than one gate, then all circuit-input wires associated with this bit will have the same label. Next, for every label w i , choose two independent keys k 0 i , k 1 i ← G(1 ℓ ); we stress that all of these keys are chosen independently of the others. Now, given these keys, the four garbled values of each gate are computed as described above and the results are permuted randomly. Finally, the output or decryption tables of the garbled circuit are computed. 
The entire garbled circuit of C, denoted GC, consists of the garbled table for each gate and the output tables. We note that the structure of C is given, and the garbled version of C is simply defined by specifying the output tables and the garbled table that belongs to each gate. This completes the description of the garbled circuit.
Let x = x 1 · · · x ℓ and y = y 1 · · · y ℓ be two ℓ-bit inputs for C. Furthermore, let w 1 , . . . , w ℓ be the input labels corresponding to x, and let w ℓ+1 , . . . , w 2ℓ be the input labels corresponding to y. It is shown in [28] that given the garbled circuit GC and the strings k
, it is possible to compute C(x, y), except with negligible probability. The way that these values are obtained is as follows. For every bit of P 1 's input, party P 1 just sends P 2 the appropriate keys k
ℓ . Furthermore, for every bit y i of P 2 's input, the parties run an oblivious transfer protocol where P 1 inputs (k 0 ℓ+i , k 1 ℓ+i ) and P 2 inputs y i . The result is that P 2 obtains the keys k
and can therefore compute the garbled circuit. The crucial observation is that P 1 learns nothing of P 2 's input by the security of the oblivious transfer, and P 2 learns nothing but the output because the circuit is encrypted and the keys k A useful lemma. In [29] , the following lemma is proven (that is actually implicit already in [28] ). The lemma states that it is possible to build a fake garbled circuit that outputs a fixed value z = f (x, y), and this is indistinguishable to an adversary who has only a single set of keys that correspond to the inputs x and y. The simulator that we construct in order to prove the security of our protocol constructs such "fake" circuits, and we therefore rely on this lemma in our proof. 
B Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
In this section we present zero-knowledge proofs that we need in our protocols. The reason for presenting the protocols in full detail is to facilitate an exact efficiency analysis.
B.1 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge -Diffie-Hellman Tuples
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of Diffie-Hellman tuples is presented in Figure B .1. The fact that this is a proof of knowledge (and not just a zero-knowledge proof system) has been proven in [19, Chapter 6] .
PROTOCOL B.1 (ZK Proof of Knowledge of Diffie-Hellman Tuples)
• Joint statement: The values (G, g 0 , g 1 , u, v) that are elements of a group G of known order q, and g is the generator.
• Auxiliary input for the prover: A witness w such that u = (g 0 ) w and v = (g 1 ) w .
• The protocol:
1. P chooses a random a ∈ {1, . . . , q}, computes α = (g 0 ) a and sends α to V .
2. The verifier V chooses random s, t ∈ {1, . . . , q}, computes c = (g 0 ) s · α t and sends c to P (this is a perfectly-hiding commitment to s).
3. P chooses a random r ∈ {1, . . . , q} and computes A = (g 0 ) r and B = (g 1 ) r . It then sends (A, B) to V .
4. V sends s and t as above to P .
P verifies that
If no, it aborts. Otherwise, it sends z = s · w + r to V . In addition, it sends a as chosen above.
V accepts if and only if
Exact efficiency. The overall number of exponentiations in the protocol is 12. However, 8 of these are of the form x a · y b (observe that the verification of A and B by V in the last step is actually also of this form). Each of these double exponentiations costs only 1.25 the cost of a standard exponentiation [31, Alg. 14.88], and thus we conclude that the protocol requires 9 exponentiations overall. In addition, it takes 5 rounds of communication and involves the exchange of 8 group elements (where we count s, t, z, a as group elements even though they are actually smaller).
B.2 Zero-Knowledge for Subset DH
The protocol below uses the technique of [7] in order to prove that half of a given set of values are of the Diffie-Hellman form. We assume familiarity with the technique of [7] here. We remark that in Protocol B.2, it is possible to use any perfect secret sharing with the properties that are defined in [7] . The secret-sharing scheme of Shamir [40] works for example, but [7] have a more efficient scheme based on matrix multiplication. The following proposition is common knowledge and follows from [7] , and the proof is therefore omitted. • The protocol:
1. Set up commitment to verifier challenge:
(a) The prover P chooses a random a ← Z q , computes α = (g 0 ) a and sends α to V .
(b) The verifier V chooses random t, c ← Z q , computes C = (g 0 ) c · α t and sends C to P (this is a perfectly-hiding commitment to c). 
Proposition B.3 Protocol B.2 is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that is secure under parallel composition, for the relation
A one-out-of-two variant. We also need to prove that one out of two tuples is a Diffie-Hellman tuple. The idea is basically as in Protocol B.2 with s = 2. This case is simpler since instead of using a secret sharing scheme the parties work in the following way:
1. The prover chooses c i as it wishes for the statement i whose proof it wants to forge;
2. The verifier sends the receiver a random c;
3. The prover sets c 2−i = c i + c.
Exact efficiency. The overall cost of the protocol is 7s + 4 exponentiations and the exchange of 3s + 4 group elements. In addition, it takes 5 rounds of communication (note that the first and last round of communication can be combined with messages from the calling protocol). In the one-out-of-two variant, the count is identical by setting s = 2.
B.3 ZK Proof for Extended Diffie-Hellman Tuples
A zero-knowledge proof of an extended Diffie-Hellman tuple is given in Protocol B.4. The input is a tuple
are Diffie-Hellman tuples. This zero-knowledge proof is used twice; once in the single-choice cut-and-choice oblivious transfer protocol in Section 3.4, and once in the main protocol itself (Protocol 4.1 in Section 4.1). In the latter use (in Protocol 4.1), the same g is used in all tuples. That is, one sets g = g 0 = g 1 in Protocol B.4 below.
PROTOCOL B.4 (ZK Proof of Knowledge of Extended Diffie-Hellman Tuple)
• Common input: (g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , h 1 , u 1 , v 1 , . . . , u η , v η ) where g 0 and g 1 are generators of a group of prime order q.
• Prover witness: a such that either h 0 = (g 0 ) a and
a for all i.
L where 2 L < q, and sends the values to the prover. The zero-knowledge property of the protocol follows directly from the zero-knowledge property of the subprotocol for proving Diffie-Hellman. The soundness follows from the following claim: Exact efficiency. The cost of this protocol is exactly the cost of the 1-out-of-2 variant of Protocol B.2 (which costs 18 exponentiations and the exchange of 10 group elements) together with an additional 2η "short" 40-bit exponentiations by each party. Under the assumption that we work in an elliptic curve group with order q of length 160 bits, we have that this is equivalent to η/2 exponentiations by each party. Thus, the result is η additional exponentiations overall. We remark that no additional rounds are needed because the γ values can be sent together with the verifier's first message (this is because the prover's first message is independent of the input statement). We conclude that there are η + 18 exponentiations, the exchange of 10 group elements and 5 rounds of communication. When this zero-knowledge protocol is used in Protocol 4.1, we have that η = s/2 and so there are s/2 + 18 exponentiations; when it is used in Section 3.4 then η = s and so there are s + 18 exponentiations.
The prover and verifier locally compute
u = η ∏ i=1 (u i ) γi and v = η ∏ i=1 (v i )
Remark.
Recall that this zero-knowledge proof is called ℓ times in Protocol 4.1, each time proving an extended Diffie-Hellman tuple of η = s/2 pairs. Specifically, for every i = 1, . . . , ℓ, party P 1 proves that (g, g r j , g a 0 i , k ′ i,j ) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple for all j / ∈ J . The cost of this is therefore sℓ + 18ℓ exponentiations. However, an alternative and equivalent way of carrying out these proofs is for P 1 to prove that for every j = 1, . . . , s it holds that (g, g a 0 i , g r j , k ′ i,j ) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. In this case, each proof costs 2ℓ + 18 exponentiations and so the overall cost is 2sℓ + 18s exponentiations. Thus, the way these proofs should be carried out depends on the values of ℓ and s (recall that ℓ is the length of P 2 's input and s is the number of circuits sent).
C Simple UC Zero-Knowledge from any Σ Protocol
For the sake of completeness, we present the simple general transformation from Σ protocols [8] to universally composable zero-knowledge arguments [4] , as appearing in [20] . This transformation is applied to the Σ protocol underlying Protocol B.2 (as described, Protocol B.2 is a stand-alone zero-knowledge proof of knowledge derived by applying a general transformation to a Σ protocol). Loosely speaking, a Σ protocol π for a relation R is a 3-round public-coin proof with the following two properties:
1. For any x in the language defined by R, and any pair of accepting conversations (α, β, γ), (α, β ′ , γ ′ ) with the same first prover message α, it is possible to efficiently compute w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
2. There exists a simulator S π who upon input x and β generates a transcript (α, β, γ) that is indistinguishable from a real proof with a verifier who replies with β upon receiving α.
A universally composable protocol is one that remains secure under arbitrary composition. Essentially, it suffices here to present a straight-line simulator and extractor in order to demonstrate universal composability. We omit a formal definition of Σ protocols and universal composability and refer to [8] and [4] , respectively, for details. Our transformation uses universally composable commitment schemes [5] which can be constructed efficiently. Using the scheme of [27] that is secure under the DDH assumption and in the common reference string model, the cost of committing to n bits is 5 Diffie-Hellman group exponentiations and the cost of decommitting is 21 such exponentiations (where the size of the group is at least 2 n ). The universally composable (multiple) commitment functionality F com is formally defined in Figure C. 1.
FIGURE C.1 (The F com Multiple-Commitment Functionality) F com proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 and P 2 , and an adversary S:
1. Upon receiving a value (Commit, sid, cid, P i , P j , w) from P i (i ∈ {1, 2}) where w ∈ {0, 1} n , record the tuple (cid, P i , P j , w) and send the message (Receipt, sid, cid) to P j and S (where j = 3 − i). Ignore subsequent (Commit, sid, cid, P i , P j , . . .) values.
2. Upon receiving a value (Open, sid, cid, P i , P j ) from P i , proceed as follows. If the tuple (cid, P i , P j , b) is recorded then send the message (Open, sid, cid, P i , P j , w) to P j and S. Otherwise, do nothing.
The idea behind the transformation. Let π be a Σ-protocol for a relation R. Then, in order to achieve simulation in the case of a corrupted verifier, we need to know the verifier query β before sending α. Although this may seem impossible it is easily achieved by having the verifier first commit to β using the universally composable commitment functionality F com . Then, the prover sends α, the verifier decommits to β, and the prover answers with γ. Now, in the simulation, the simulator is able to learn β before the commitment is opened and thus before it sends α. Thus, it is possible to use S π to simulate the proof after β has been committed to. This takes care of the problem of simulating in the case of a corrupted verifier. However, in the case of a corrupted prover, we need to extract the witness used by the prover without rewinding. This is difficult because the Σ protocol only provides a method for extraction when two different accepting conversations with the same first-prover message are observed. This seems to require rewinding. We solve this problem as follows. Assume for now that β is a single bit. Then, for any α, define γ 0 to be an accepting prover response when β = 0, and define γ 1 analogously for β = 1. Then, after receiving the verifier's commitment to β, the prover sends α together with a commitment to γ 0 and a commitment to γ 1 . After the verifier reveals β, the prover reveals γ β . Now, if the prover indeed sent commitments to two accepting responses γ 0 and γ 1 it follows that the simulator can extract the witness without any rewinding (recall that the simulator can open all commitments). This yields soundness of one half; in order to improve this, we repeat L times and obtain a soundness error of 2 −L . Observe that if the original Σ protocol had soundness of 1/2, then the transformation is extraordinarily efficient. However, if it had negligible soundness -which is often the case -then the transformation costs L times the original protocol. Nevertheless, since the error is 2 −L , the value of L can be set to be quite small. We remark that if β comes from a large domain, then we arbitrarily fix two values from the domain to be used in the protocol. Finally, we note that once the prover commits first to its γ values, there is no need to have the verifier commit to β ahead of time. See Protocol C.2 for a formal description.
PROTOCOL C.2 (Transformation from Σ-Protocols to UC-ZK)
Let π be a 3-round Σ protocol for a relation R. Let β 0 , β 1 be two arbitrary distinct values in the domain of verifier queries. Denote by Π the protocol as follows:
• Inputs: The prover P and verifier V both hold a common statement x; the prover P has a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R.
• Session identifier: Both parties have the same sid
1. First prover message:
(a) P runs the prover instructions L times for the Σ protocol π in order to obtain L first prover message α 1 , . . . , α L . The prover P commits to all of these values by sending (Commit, sid, i, P, V, α i ) to F com , for every i. (b) For every i = 1, . . . , L, the prover P computes the second prover message in the case that the verifier query after α i is β 0 and in the case that it is β 1 ; we denote these messages by γ i ) is accepting; if not, it sends an invalid witness w ′ to F zk (i.e., w ′ such that (x, w ′ ) / ∈ R). Otherwise, if for every i, at most one of (α i , 0, γ 0 i ) and (α i , 1, γ 1 i ) is an accepting transcript in the Σ protocol, then S outputs fail and halts. Otherwise, it uses the extractor of the Σ protocol to obtain a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R and sends this to F zk . In addition, S sends all messages that it receives from the environment Z to A, and vice versa. The fact that this simulation is indistinguishable follows from the fact that the only difference between the real and ideal executions is when S outputs fail, which occurs in the case that all (α i , β i , γ β i i ) are accepting (and so V would accept), and yet at most one of all (α i , 0, γ 0 i ) and (α i , 1, γ 1 i ) is accepting (and so S does not obtain a valid witness). However, this event occurs with probability at most 2 −L , which is negligible.
In the case that the adversary A controls the verifier V , the simulator S works by handing the appropriate Receipt messages to A. Then, S receives from A values β 1 , . . . , β L . S then hands the Σ protocol simulator all of the β i messages and obtains accepting transcripts (α i , β i , γ i ). Finally, S hands A all of the commitment openings to be to the α i , γ i values generated by the simulator.As above, it also sends all messages that it receives from the environment Z to A, and vice versa. The indistinguishability here follows immediately from the indistinguishability of the Σ protocol simulated transcripts.
Exact efficiency of the transformation. The complexity of the universally composable zeroknowledge protocol is the cost of the initial Σ protocol plus 3L universally-composable commitments, 2L of which are opened. As we have mentioned, the commitment scheme of [27] is such that a commitment to n bits requires 5 exponentiations and a decommitment requires 21. Thus, the cost of Protocol C.2 is L times the initial Σ protocol plus (3 × 5 + 2 × 21) · L = 57L regular Diffie-Hellman group exponentiations.
